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Economic perceptions affect policy preferences and government support. It thus matters that these perceptions are driven by
factors other than the economy, including media coverage. We nevertheless know little about how media reflect economic
trends, and whether they influence (or are influenced by) public economic perceptions. This article explores the economy,
media, and public opinion, focusing in particular on whether media coverage and the public react to changes in or levels of
economic activity, and the past, present, or future economy. Analyses rely on content-analytic data drawn from 30,000 news
stories over 30 years in the United States. Results indicate that coverage reflects change in the future economy, and that this
both influences and is influenced by public evaluations. These patterns make more understandable the somewhat surprising
finding of positive coverage and public assessments in the midst of the Great Recession. They also may help explain previous
findings in political behavior.
A growing body of work demonstrates a link be-tween economic conditions and both attitudesabout government policy and preferences for
spending (e.g., Durr 1993; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stim-
son 2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Stevenson 2001;
Wlezien 1995). There also are vast literatures explor-
ing the degree to which support for governments and
leaders follows economic trends. Some work focuses
on economic conditions and assessments of presiden-
tial/government performance and voting (e.g., Bartels
and Zaller 2001; Campbell 1996; Clarke and Stewart
1995; Erikson 1989; Happy 1986; Hibbs 1987; MacKuen,
Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Nadeau, Niemi, and Am-
ato 1994, 1996; Nadeau et al. 1999; Price and Sanders
1993; Sanders 1996, 1999; Sanders, Marsh, and Ward
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1993; for reviews, see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000,
2007); a related body of research uses key economic vari-
ables to predict—with a good degree of success—the out-
come of elections, both in the United States and else-
where (e.g., Abramowitz 1988; Erikson andWlezien 2012;
Lewis-Beck 1988b; Wlezien and Erikson 1996; for recent
reviews, see Kayser and Wlezien 2011; Linn, Nagler, and
Morales 2010).There is, in sum, a considerablebodyof ev-
idence highlighting the political importance of economic
conditions.
Public perceptions of the economy matter as well.
In fact, past work suggests that economic perceptions
influence vote intentions and government evaluations
above and beyond the impact of the actual economy
(e.g., Nadeau, Niemi, and Amato 1994). The sources of
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public perceptions of the economy are nevertheless not
well understood. For instance, although research suggests
that media coverage can affect public economic percep-
tions (e.g., De Boef and Kellstedt 2004; Nadeau et al.
1999; Soroka 2006, 2014),1 we have only a partial under-
standing of what causes that coverage. The real economy
surely plays a role; it is not well understood how. It also is
not clear whether and how public economic perceptions
themselves impact coverage. This article seeks to redress
this imbalance.
The central contribution here is an investigation of
two absolutely critical but underappreciated aspects of
themedia-economy-opinionnexus. First, we consider the
possibility that bothmedia and public opinion reactmore
to changes than the levels in economic conditions. They
may not react to high unemployment so much as an
increase in the rate, for instance. Second, we consider
whether the media and the public respond to the past,
present, or future economy. They may not react to where
we have been as much as where we are; but it also may be
that media react mostly to where we are going. Indeed,
media may also react in part not just to the economy, but
also to public perceptions of the economy; that is, media
content may partly reflect where the public thinks the
economy is going.
Some of these possibilities have been explored in part
in existing political behavioral research, which we discuss
in greater detail in the following section. The relative im-
pact of changes versus levels in the future versus the past
and present economy has received very little attention in
the literature focused on media content, however. This is
true in spite of the fact that the ways in whichmass media
register and convey economic information may provide
valuable insights relevant to our understanding of politi-
cal behavior. Indeed, in addition to better understanding
the ways in which the economy becomes “news,” one ob-
jective here is to see whether media content mirrors, and
perhaps even helps explain, existing political-behavioral
findings.
The article begins with a review of the literature on
the relationship between the economy, economic news,
and public perceptions. We then introduce and analyze
ourdata: content-analytic results fromnearly 30,000news
stories over 20 years in the United States, alongside mea-
sures of the economy and public economic sentiment.
We explore the relationship between media content and
the economy, and then turn to aggregate-level trends
in public opinion. Results speak to the nature of the
1Also see, for example, work on the impact of presidential rhetoric
by Wood, Owens, and Durham (2005).
relationship between the economy, economic news, and
public sentiment; in particular, they make clear the ex-
tent to whichmedia stories (andmedia effects) are driven
by short-term changes, rather than long-term levels, of
economic indicators. It appears that both the media
and the public are particularly responsive to where the
economy is going in the future, in addition to—and at
least sometimes more than—where it has been or cur-
rently is. As we shall see, this has consequences for pub-
lic assessments of the economy, which themselves also
affect media coverage. All of this matters, we believe,
for the way in which the economy matters for political
behavior.
The Economy, Economic News,
and Economic Perceptions
The literature focused directly on media coverage of the
economy is relatively small, but there is a considerable
body ofwork focused on the impact that thismedia cover-
agemayhave onpublic opinion. This researchmakes clear
that there are close relationships between the condition of
the economy, the media’s portrayal of this condition, and
people’s opinions about the economy. Put simply: The
media play an important role in shaping public opinion
about the economy. This has been well established in the
literatures on public opinion and political communica-
tion (e.g., Blood and Phillips 1995, 1997; Boomgaarden
et al. 2011; De Boef and Kellstedt 2004; Glynn, Huge, and
Hoffman 2008; Goidel et al. 2010); it has been illustrated
in work by economists as well (e.g., Carroll 2003; Doms
andMorin 2004; Hollanders and Vliegenthart 2011). Ad-
ditionally, the political importance of the effects of media
coverage on public opinion is made readily clear in the
literatures (cited above) on policy preferences and eco-
nomic voting.
Existing research tends to focus on either the
(a) volume or (b) tone of media coverage. It may be that
both play important—and distinct—roles in the media-
opinion relationship, however. Consider work suggesting
that, since gathering and processing information about
the economy is costly, people do not continuously update
their expectations but rather do so only occasionally and
remain largely inattentive in between (e.g., Carroll 2003
andDoepke et al. 2008, both of which suggest that updat-
ing may occur less than once a year). Expectation updat-
ing, according to this work, occurs when there are high
volumes of economic news, and economic news tends to
be most frequent when the economy is bad (e.g., Doms
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andMorin 2004; Lamla and Lein 2008; Shah et al. 1999).2
It follows that individuals’ expectations may be a product
not just of media tone, but of the volume of coverage as
well, which may often serve to augment the impact of
negative tone.
We explore effects of both volume and tone below.
Additionally, we provide amuchmore detailed discussion
ofmeasures of tone and volume inAppendixA in the sup-
porting information. For now, what is most important is
that both may matter for public perceptions, above and
beyond economic conditions. This is because media con-
tent is not just a reflection of economic conditions. There
are a variety of differences between the economy andme-
dia coverage of the economy across both time and media
outlets, and there is a growing body of work making this
fact increasingly clear (see discussion below). There is
relatively little work speaking to the nature of the differ-
ence, however.3 This is disconcerting given the potentially
important implications of discrepancies between the real
economy and economic news.
The literature points to what appear to be striking in-
stances of such discrepancies. One relatively well-known
example (noted by Lipset 1993, among others) is from
the 1992 U.S. election: The argument is that President
Bush lost his reelection bid not on the basis of the actual
state of the economy, but due to people’s perceptions of
the state of the economy, which were driven by overtly
negative economic coverage. It is this election that pro-
duced the phrase “It’s the economy, stupid,” attributed
to Clinton strategist James Carville and meant to be the
Clinton campaign’s primary message. (This, of course,
is the phrase that led to the title of the current article.)
The aim was to highlight what was then still a faltering
economy in an effort to encourage voters to reject Bush
and support Clinton instead. Research highlights the im-
portance of economic perceptions in that election (e.g.,
Alvarez andNagler 1995), and research on other elections
provides some supporting evidence. (See work that pre-
dicts U.S. election outcomes using measures of economic
perceptions; e.g., Holbrook 1994.) In fact, perceptions of
2Indeed, media generally tend to focus on “problems”; see, for
example, Altheide (1997) and Bennett (1997).
3There are some important exceptions, however. Fogarty (2005) ex-
amines the connection between various economic indicators and
New York Times front-page coverage. Goidel et al. (2010) explore
the relationship between various media sources (local and national
newspapers and TV broadcasts) and the economy (as well as opin-
ion). Harrington (1989) examines the degree to which network
news focuses on negative information, contrasting election and
nonelection years. Farnsworth and Lichter (2006, 2011) examine
variation in media coverage of presidents on a range of issues, in-
cluding the economy. Also see work listed in Appendix D in the
supporting information.
the economy can matter more than objective conditions
for citizens’ political judgments (e.g., Sanders 2000); it
also appears that media coverage can distort perceptions,
at least to some degree, including in 1992 (Hetherington
1996).
What drives the gap betweenmedia content and real-
ity? One account, which we discuss further in the follow-
ing section, stresses the significance of “biases” in media
gatekeeping and news production. Another variant, and
one thatwewant to emphasize here, is that the economy is
large and complex, and can be described and reflected in
many different ways, and media content tends to capture
certain elements of the economymore systematically than
others. Past work has demonstrated a tendency for media
to focus more on negative than on positive information
(e.g., Soroka2006, 2012, 2014), for instance.Herewewant
to examine other elements of the economy onwhich both
media content and public economic sentiment tend to be
focused.
The Focus of Media Coverage
Our examination focuses on two aspects of the media-
economy relationship. First, we examine whether theme-
dia coverage reflects changes in the economy alongside, if
not entirely instead of, levels. Second, we assess whether
coverage responds to the economic past, present, or
future.
Changes versus Levels
The idea that changematters tomedia coverage is notnew,
although it has not been examined in much detail where
aggregate trends in media content are concerned. The
emphasis is clear in the general literature on journalistic
practices, however. There is a body of work suggesting
that journalistic norms lead to systematic patterns in news
content (e.g., Bennett 1997; Meyrowitz 1994; Shoemaker
and Vos 2009).
More specifically, research on journalistic practices
makes clear the significance of novelty and change in the
selection of news stories. Thomas Patterson (1994, 60)
writes that “above all else, reporters are taught to search
what is new and different in events of the past twenty-four
hours.” Election campaigns are particularly attractive to
journalists, for instance, because theyprovide a constantly
shifting set of topics and characters (e.g., Skewes 2007; see
also a review of the “game” frame in Aalberg, Stro¨mba¨ck,
and de Vreese 2012). Discussions of ongoing, often long-
standing, political issues systematically get less coverage
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than whatever new topics arise.4 Novelty and change are
defining features of newsworthiness.5
Studies of the actual content of news stories high-
light similar themes. There is a growing body of work
focused on how the newsroom priorities of timeliness
and novelty tend to reduce coverage of longer-term pro-
cesses, for instance. This has been an emphasis in work on
science reporting in particular, especially on environmen-
tal issues (e.g., Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; Mazur 2009;
Mazur and Lee 1997; McComas and Shanahan 1999; Mc-
Cright and Dunlap 2003; Soroka et al. 2012; Trumbo
1995).
But one does not need to look to very long-term
processes to see the priority that novelty has in news gate-
keeping; for example,media coverageof campaign-period
polls increases with poll volatility (Matthews, Pickup, and
Cutler 2012). There is, of course, no reason to believe that
this tendency is evident only in science news or coverage
of pre-election polls.
Journalists are not working in a vacuum—they are
writing to appeal to an audience. So it should come as
no surprise that research in political behavior points to
the importance of changes in conditions where pub-
lic perceptions are concerned as well. For instance, re-
search on election outcomes reveals that voters reward
and punish incumbents mostly on the basis of economic
change. There is an especially long history of such re-
search onU.S. presidential elections, where scholars using
different economicmeasures all demonstrate that incum-
bent support depends on the “slope” of the economy—
the direction and magnitude of economic change—not
the level per se (Abramowitz 1988; Bartels and Zaller
2001; Campbell 1996; Hibbs 1987; Wlezien and Erik-
son 1996). Importantly, this work also shows that eco-
nomic change closer to the election matters more to vot-
ers than earlier economic change.6 Much the same is true
for government approval between elections (especially
4“The first time that a candidate takes a position on a key issue, the
press is almost certain to report. Further statements on the same
issue become progressively less newsworthy, unless a new wrinkle
is added” (Patterson 1994, 61).
5The literature on this issue is vast. See, for example, Farnsworth
and Lichter (2006), Jamieson (1992), Robinson and Sheehan
(1983), and Davis (1992). Also see Klein’s (2010) related commen-
tary on journalism and Fuller (2010), who links the journalistic
pursuit of novelty to humans’ evolutionarily advantageous ten-
dency to be especially attentive to new information.
6This is important because theElectionDayoutcome is not a simple
sum of changes over the course of the term, which would imply
that the level of the economy is determining.
see Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002);7 compar-
ative research is also confirming (see, e.g., Anderson
and Wlezien 1997; Clarke and Stewart 1995; Kayser and
Wlezien 2011; Van Der Brug, Van Der Eijk, and Franklin
2007).
The Past, Current, or Future Economy
We are also interested in the time horizon of the eco-
nomic conditions reflected inmedia content. Specifically,
we are interested in the possibility that media content
focuses more on prospective than on current or retro-
spective economic conditions. Work in political behavior
has considered this issue—the distinction in that litera-
ture is between naive voters who can base votes only on
past conditions versus sophisticated voters who are able
to take forward projections into account. Research ini-
tially focused largely on the former possibility, although
a literature on the latter has also accumulated (for re-
views, see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, 2007; Singer
and Carlin 2013). There is, for instance, a considerable
body of work suggesting that voters are driven in part by
prospective evaluations (e.g., Fiorina 1981; Kuklinski and
West 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988a; Lockerbie 1991); the same
appears to be true for trends in both presidential approval
(Chappell &Keech 1985;MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson
1992) and “most important problem” responses (Wlezien
2005) as well. In sum, to borrow MacKuen, Erikson, and
Stimson’s (1992) terminology, voters sometimes appear
to behave more like (prospectively focused) bankers than
(retrospectively focused) peasants.
The work byMacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992)
is particularly relevant here. Their primary focus is on
the interplay between the economy, consumer sentiment
(both retrospective and prospective), and presidential
evaluations. In accounting for consumer sentiment, how-
ever, they add trends in a set of survey questions asking
whether respondents have heard any “favorable or unfa-
vorable” news about business conditions. The measure is
strongly related to economic expectations, a signal that
media content may be rather forward-looking.
These authors do not directly examine economic ef-
fects on media content, however, and there have been, to
our knowledge, no serious considerations of the relative
weight of past, current, and future economic conditions
in shaping economic news. Analyses of media coverage
of economic conditions tend to focus on the relation-
ship between media coverage and a single indicator of
7The effects on approval are a bit less obvious, as changes in the
economy impact changes in approval, which tend to decay over
time.
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economic conditions—sometimes prospective, although
typically not. In fact, the existingmedia-focused literature
does not directly test the relative importance of levels or
changes either. For more detailed information, Appendix
D in the supporting information provides a list of recent
studies of media content on the economy, noting deci-
sions regarding levels versus changes, and past, present,
or future economic measures.
Given work on (a) the potential importance of eco-
nomic sentiment to political behavior and (b) the poten-
tial importance of media content to economic sentiment,
we see this as an important gap in the literature. We
thus consider here whether media focus more on future
than on current and past economic conditions. In doing
so, we may be one step closer to accounting for the rel-
ative importance of prospective evaluations in political
judgments—the future economy matters in part because
this is what media content is focused on.
The Data
We rely on three bodies of data: macroeconomic mea-
sures, media data, and measures of public opinion. We
focus here on monthly time series, from 1980 to 2011
inclusive. Macroeconomic data for the United States are
drawn from the Conference Board’s economic indicators
series.8 These allow us to assess whether media content is
most reflective of past, current, or future economic con-
ditions, by using their lagging, coincident, and leading
economic indicators. The time series for the period be-
tween January 1980, and December 2011 are displayed in
Figure 1.
The Lagging and Coincident Indicators in the fig-
ure are exactly as they are distributed by the Conference
Board.9 We use a slightly revised version of the lead-
ing indicators series, however. Leading indicators nor-
mally include a measure of consumer sentiment. We
want to look at the relationship betweenmedia, the econ-
omy, and public opinion, however, and doing so requires
8Conference Board composite indicator series were initially ob-
tained from the Thomson Reuters Datastream financial database.
The revised leading economic indicators series we use below was
obtained directly from the Conference Board.
9We detrend each of the Conference Board series using a Hodrick-
Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott 1997). This is the same pro-
cedure the OECD uses to detrend their own leading indicators.
The main effect of detrending in this way is removing the slow up-
ward trend in indicators over the last 40 years. That said, using the
raw series makes little difference to the analyses that follow, results
relating to which are available upon request.
economic measures that do not include (at least not di-
rectly) public opinion itself. For this reason, we use a
Conference Board measure of leading indicators purged
of consumer sentiment.10 The original and revised se-
ries are very highly correlated—based on monthly data
spanning 1980 to 2013, they are correlated in levels at
.986 and in monthly changes at .976. (Also see Figure 1,
which includes both series, the differences between which
are almost imperceptible.) Even so, we proceed with the
new measure knowing that analyses will not suffer from
measure-induced endogeneity.
Given our interest in the relative importance of past,
current, and future economic trends, the capacity of Con-
ference Board indices to adequately capture each is of real
importance. They are designed for precisely this purpose,
of course; we can in part rely on the Conference Board’s
own research on the matter (see, e.g., Conference Board
2001; Levanon et al. 2011). But there is also related re-
search in economics (e.g., Rogers 1994; Stock andWatson
1989; Vaccara and Zarnowitz 1978) and even in political
science (Wlezien and Erikson 1996) showing that the
indicators do work (e.g., the index of leading economic
indicators predicts future economic growth). Appendix C
in the supporting information outlines the composition
of each index in some detail and provides some diagnos-
tic statistics of the relationship between the indices (and
media content) and other macroeconomic time series.
In short, there is good evidence that the indices capture
past, present, and future economic circumstances. While
the indices surely correlate over time, they also vary in-
dependently. We thus can directly assess in our empirical
analysis to which component themedia and/or the public
respond.
Media variables are based on a comprehensive origi-
nal database of economic news stories from theNew York
Times and the Washington Post. The stories are obtained
from the Lexis-Nexis database, using a subject search de-
signed to identify all stories dealingwithmajormacroeco-
nomic issues.11 Results aremanually examined to confirm
that each story focused only on the domestic economy
10The consumer expectations measure is simply excluded from the
calculation of the index, and the remaining nine items are left at
their existing weights.
11The searchwas designedbased on an exhaustive list of Lexis-Nexis
subject categories. The final search captured stories forwhich any of
the following termswere listed as “Relevancy:Major Terms only”—
under (a) “Economic Conditions”: Deflation, Economic Decline,
EconomicDepression, EconomicGrowth, andEconomicRecovery,
Inflation and Recession; under (b) “Economic Indicators”: Average
Earnings, Consumer Credit, Consumer Prices, Consumer Spend-
ing, Employment Rates, Existing Home Sales, Money Supply, New
Home Sales, Productivity, Retail Trade Figures, Unemployment
Rates, Wholesale Prices.
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FIGURE 1 Composite Indicators in the United States, 1980–2011
(i.e., not on the economy of other countries); irrelevant
stories are eliminated. Any story of fewer than 100 words
is also excluded, since these are typically short notes rather
than actual newspaper articles. Economic coverage also
tends to include stories that are in fact just long lists of
reported economic figures and indicators; these too are
eliminated. The final data set includes 31,180 stories for
the two newspapers.
The next task is to convert the database of stories
into time series of economic news coverage. There are,
of course, several different approaches; we focus here on
two different measures:
1. Volume of Coverage (Coverage): The total number
of stories on the economy—a straightforward
monthly article count.
2. Tone of Content (Tone): Monthly article tone,
derived from Lexicoder, automated content-
analytic software using a simple bag-of-words
approach to content analysis. Coding is based
on the Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary (LSD),
which has already been described in some de-
tail and tested on economic data (Young and
Soroka 2012). The LSD produces counts of pos-
itive words and negative words; we use those to
produce a measure of net tone using the follow-
ing simple formula: (#positivewords –#negative
words)/total # words, where the word total in-
cludes all words in the article (positive, negative,
and without tone). The measure thus captures
both the direction and magnitude of tone, con-
trolling for article size. Since values tend to be
relatively small, we multiply the measure by 100
below.12
The volume and tone of coverage are illustrated in
Figure 2. Note that the two series are negatively corre-
lated, at –.22 in levels and –.14 in changes. This reflects the
fact that coverage increases when the news is bad, a well-
known aspect of modern mass media (discussed above).
It also suggests that while tone should be positively related
to the economy and opinion, volume should be negatively
related. Of course, the fact that they are weakly correlated
means that there are instances when the tone is positive
but volume is high, and when tone is negative while vol-
ume is low. The possibility that volume and tone interact
thus seems to be worth investigating, and we do so in our
analyses of public opinion below.
We want to examine the impact of both the economy
and media content on public opinion as well, and we do
so using consumer sentiment data from the Thomson
Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers.
We focus here on two sociotropic measures of economic
12There are more sophisticated approaches to measuring tone, in-
cluding the Coefficient of Imbalance (CI), one attempt to com-
bine both volume and tone. See Appendix A in the supporting
information for a discussion of the CI measure, alongside other
considerations in the measurement of tone in media content.
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FIGURE 2 The Volume and Tone of Economic News Coverage
sentiment, one retrospective and the other prospective.13
Both are illustrated in Figure 3.
Correlations between all measures are shown in
Table 1, in both levels and changes. Even these basic re-
sults point to some of the most critical findings below.
Note that both the tone and volume of media content are
most strongly related to leading, rather than coincident
or lagging, economic indicators series. (Tone is related
to lagging and coincident indicators as well, but in the
13MSCI data are available at http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu. Al-
though they are readily available, we do not focus on egotropic
measures here, since these tend to be more reflective of personal
experiences, and thus somewhat less connected to national eco-
nomic indicators. That said, analyses using egocentric measures
are also available upon request. Results are not fundamentally dif-
ferent from what is presented here, though all relationships are
weaker, as we should expect.
wrong direction.) Volume is negatively related to leading
indicators (–0.68); tone is positively related (0.19), evi-
dence that coverage increases when the economy is bad
(i.e., as tone worsens). Economic sentiment, too, is most
powerfully related to leading indicators. This is true for
retrospective evaluations, at least; prospective evaluations
show no positive correlation with the economy, but they
do show a strong positive connection to media tone.
Predictably, relationships between the series in
changes, in the bottom panel of Table 1, aremuch weaker.
Some similar patterns remain, however: retrospective
economic sentiment is correlated with leading indica-
tors; prospective sentiment is correlated withmedia tone;
and the volume and tone of economic news are nega-
tively correlated. These are all just preliminary observa-
tions, though theydo foreshadow forthcoming results.We
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FIGURE 3 Public Opinion about the Economy
TABLE 1 Bivariate Correlations: Economic, Media, and Public OpinionMeasures
In (Concurrent) Levels EI, Lag EI, Coin EI, Lead Volume Tone SR
EI, Coincident 0.514∗
EI, Leading –0.072 0.664∗
Volume –0.019 –0.420∗ –0.686∗
Tone (LSD) –0.355∗ –0.167∗ 0.188∗ –0.220∗
Sociotropic Retrospective (SR) –0.256∗ 0.191∗ 0.621∗ –0.582∗ 0.425∗
Sociotropic Prospective –0.507∗ –0.506∗ –0.266∗ 0.166∗ 0.377∗ 0.265∗
In (Concurrent) Changes EI, Lag EI, Coin EI, Lead Volume Tone SR
EI, Coincident –0.078
EI, Leading –0.311∗ 0.544∗
Volume 0.056 –0.078 –0.181∗
Tone (LSD) –0.030 0.030 0.085 –0.135∗
Sociotropic Retrospective (SR) –0.070 0.132∗ 0.339∗ –0.142∗ 0.184∗
Sociotropic Prospective –0.068 –0.116∗ 0.047 –0.047 0.176∗ 0.404∗
Note: N varies from 338 to 384, depending on data availability ∗p < .05.
now turn to a more rigorous examination of the relation-
ships between the economy, media, and public sentiment
below.
The Economy and theMedia
We begin with an analysis of the relationship between
economic indicators and media coverage. We rely—here
and in all subsequent analyses—on time-series error
correction models (ECMs), where current changes in a
dependent variable are regressed on lagged levels of that
variable and both current changes and lagged levels of
the independent variable(s) as well.14 ECMs have some
14Note that we use regression models appropriate for interval-level
data in spite of the fact that one of our variables, the number
of economic news stories, is, strictly speaking, a count variable—it
cannot be less than zero, and it takes on only integer values. Neither
of these facts is problematic for our analyses, particularly since the
number of economic news stories per month is always well above
zero. In our data, the minimum value is 17 and the maximum is
239; the variable is positively skewed, then (skewness = 1.16), but
it is essentially a normal distribution with a right-hand tail.
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TABLE 2 Responsiveness of Media to Lagging, Coincident, and Leading Indicators, Taken Separately
DV
 in Countt  in Tonet
EI Type Lag Coin Lead Lag Coin Lead
DVt−1 –.201∗∗∗ –.245∗∗∗ –.350∗∗∗ –.555∗∗∗ –.553∗∗∗ –.588∗∗∗
(.032) (.034) (.039) (.046) (.045) (.045)
 EIt –2.999 –14.767∗∗∗ –6.058∗∗∗ –.060 .226∗∗∗ .156∗∗∗
(3.269) (4.065) (1.539) (.045) (.059) (.025)
EIt−1 1.287∗ –1.300 –1.914∗∗∗ –.043∗∗∗ –.030∗∗ .006
(.641) (.730) (.312) (.010) (.010) (.004)
Constant 15.530∗∗∗ 18.908∗∗∗ 26.427∗∗∗ .121∗∗∗ .120∗∗∗ .129∗∗∗
(2.643) (2.803) (3.067) (.018) (.017) (.017)
N 383 383 383 383 383 383
R-squared .110 .130 .204 .279 .290 .315
Note: Cells contain ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Count is the total number of articles;
tone is net tone based on the LSD.
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
statistical advantages when dealing with nonstationary
time series, those that wander in the form of a random
walk.15 They also have practical advantages as a general
modeling approach to representing the relationships
between time series, including stationary series. That is,
using ECMs, one can determine the specific functional
form relating variables (De Boef and Keele 2008).16
Most importantly for our purposes, ECMs can pro-
vide some insight into the relative impact of short- versus
long-term effects of the economy onmedia content (and,
below, the state of public opinion). Consider the general
ECM:
Yt = 0 +1Yt−1 +0Xt +1Xt−1 + εt, (1)
where current changes in Y are regressed on lagged levels
of Y, current changes in X, and lagged levels of X. The
error correction rate is captured by 1; the short-run
effects of X are captured by 0; and the long-term effects
of X, referred to as the long-run multiplier (LRM, the
total effect that X has on Y, distributed over time periods
t+1 to t+k), are captured by 1/−1. In fact, the LRM
is more easily observed when the ECM is expressed in its
15They are particularly advantageous when dealing with nonsta-
tionary series that are cointegrated (see, e.g., Durr 1992).
16Theautoregressivedistributed lag (ADL)model is another flexible
approach. Here the dependent variable is regressed on lagged levels
of that variable and the independent variable(s). Results using the
ADL specification are available upon request.
standard form (rather than the equation by which it is
estimated, above), as follows:
Yt = 0 +0Xt +(Yt−1 − Xt−1)+ εt, (2)
where the error correction rate is captured by  and the
long-runmultiplier is captured by  .17 We pay special at-
tention to these separate elements of the ECMs estimated
below, as each provides valuable information about the
nature of the relationship betweenmedia content and the
economy. Interpreting each element also requires consid-
eration of the characteristics of the time series, in partic-
ular the extent to which changes in the series are tran-
sient or long-lasting. This can be assessed using tests for
stationarity, which we summarize in Appendix B in the
supporting information and discuss when characterizing
the results.
Tables 2 and 3 show ECMs in which current changes
in media volume and tone are regressed on their own
lagged levels, and both current changes and lagged levels
of economic indicators. Table 2 shows models for each of
17The ECM is mathematically equivalent to the standard ADL
model including current effects of the independent variable, that
is, where levels of Y are regressed on lagged levels of Y and both
current and lagged levels of X: Yt = 0 + 1 Yt−1 + 0 Xt + 1
Xt−1 + εt. The coefficient 0 in this ADL will be identical to the
coefficient 0 in the ECM in Equation (1), and the coefficient 1
in the ADL will be equal to the difference between 0 and 1 in
the ECM. (Also, 1 in the ADL will be equal to 1 minus 1 in the
ECM.)
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TABLE 3 Responsiveness of Media to Lagging, Coincident, and Leading Indicators, Taken Together
DV
 in Countt  in Tonet
DVt−1 –.257∗∗∗ –.352∗∗∗ –.379∗∗∗ –.566∗∗∗ –.622∗∗∗ –.620∗∗∗
(.035) (.039) (.041) (.046) (.047) (.047)
Lagging
 CIt –2.265 –6.449 .006 .044
(3.829) (3.793) (.055) (.056)
CIt−1 1.300 –2.242∗ –.017 .011
(.967) (1.101) (.015) (.016)
Coincident
CIt –11.887∗ 2.032 –1.127 .187∗∗ .004 .021
(4.896) (4.981) (5.164) (.070) (.075) (.077)
CIt−1 –1.870 .719 2.716 –.023 –.043∗∗ –.052∗
(.984) (1.019) (1.415) (.014) (.016) (.021)
Leading
 CIt –5.790∗∗ –7.001∗∗ .116∗∗∗ .124∗∗∗
(2.142) (2.213) (.032) (.034)
CIt−1 –2.138∗∗∗ –2.568∗∗∗ .016∗∗ .017∗
(.426) (.505) (.006) (.006)
Constant 19.827∗∗∗ 26.501∗∗∗ 28.509∗∗∗ .123∗∗∗ .139∗∗∗ .139∗∗∗
(2.876) (3.080) (3.200) (.017) (.018) (.018)
N 383 383 383 383 383 383
R-squared .138 .205 .215 .294 .329 .330
Note: Cells contain OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Count is the total number of articles; tone is net tone based on
the LSD.
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
our two measures of media content: volume and tone.18
In each case, we examine, separately, the impact of lag-
ging, coincident, and leading indicators. Table 3 includes
models that combine all three economic indicators series,
entered simultaneously in models of media content.
We begin our discussion with a simple diagnostic is-
sue: Does media coverage reflect past, current, or future
economic trends?Results in these tables are relatively clear
on this issue—media volume and tone are most strongly
related to indicators of both the present and the future.
Results in Table 2 suggest that changes in media coverage
are not at all related to changes in the levels of lagging
indicators. This is perhaps as we should expect; media
most likely do not report what happened months ago.
Results are different using current and future economic
18Although we address the possibility of a measure that combines
volumeand tone, both in the supporting informationand inmodels
of public opinion below, we do not use a Volume × Tone measure
as a dependent variable here. Doing so produces amodel that is not
very different from themodel of tone, however; results are available
upon request.
indicators, as the results in Table 2 reveal that media cov-
erage is systematically related to both; R-squared values
actually suggest that the future matters somewhat more
than the present.
The relative importance of the future economy is
clearer in Table 3. Here we examine the relative impact of
indicators series by including them simultaneously in the
same models. The first model compares lagging and co-
incident indicators; the second includes coincident and
leading indicators; the third compares all three. As we
would expect given Table 2 results, coincident indica-
tors dominate lagging ones, but leading indicators dom-
inate coincident ones. Indeed, in the saturated model,
only leading indicators are statistically significant in both
changes and levels.
Clearly, media content is responsive mainly to lead-
ing indicators. This is not an insignificant finding. A good
deal of work in political communication, and in eco-
nomics as well, focuses on media content as a function of
current economic conditions. It most certainly is, at least
in part. But media content on the economy appears to be
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TABLE 4 The Short- and Long-Term Impacts of the Economy onMedia Content
Count Tone
Rate of Error Correction () –.350 –.588
Short-Term Effect (0) –6.058 .156
Long-Run Multiplier () –5.469 ns
Note: Based on models using leading indicators in Table 2.
substantially future-oriented. That is, it responds more
to where the economy is going, not where it has been or
currently is. This has potentially important consequences
for public opinion and politics (discussed further below).
What about the relative impact of short-term change
in, versus long-term levels of, economic indicators?
Table 4 summarizes the results from what appear to be
our “best” models—models that rely on leading indica-
tors alone (from Table 2).
Table 4 shows values for the error correction rate, the
short-term impact of changes in the economy, and the
long-run multiplier effect of economic levels. Each pro-
vides useful information about the relationship between
the economy and media content; see our discussion of
Equations (1) and (2) above. Consider first the model for
the number of articles dealing with the economy. From
the third column of Table 2, a one-unit upward change in
leading indicators leads to a roughly 6.1-article decrease
in the current month. (In practice, changes are typically
smaller; the interquartile range for monthly changes in
the leading indicators series is –0.23 to +0.3.) This is the
immediate impact of a one-unit increase. There also is
a long-term impact that alters the equilibrium level of
coverage. We know this for two reasons: (1) The coef-
ficient for the lagged level of leading economic indica-
tors in Table 2 is statistically significant, and (2) leading
economic indicators is a nonstationary variable, mean-
ing that changes to it are permanent and persist into the
future (see Appendix B in the supporting information).
The latter is important because an increase or a decrease
cannot have a long-term effect if it does not last.
The long-term impact is not directly estimated in
Table 2 and must be calculated from the coefficient
(–1.91) for the lagged level of leading indicators as well as
the error correction parameter (–0.35). Simple division
shows the impact to be 5.5 articles. The short-run impact
thus exceeds the long-run impact by a small amount, and
we know from the error correction parameter that the
difference is corrected at a rate of 0.35 on average, that
is, about a third of the remaining disequilibrium each
month. The impact of the economy thus is immediate
and fairly long-lasting, as nearly three-quarters of the
immediate effect (5.5 of 6.1) persists, influencing cover-
age into the future.
Things are quite different for media tone. Here
the short-term impact of a one-unit change in leading
indicators is 0.16. (As the interquartile range for tone
is 0.03 to 0.43, this is no small shift.) There is no real
long-term impact, however. The coefficient for lagged
leading indicators is 0.006 and not statistically significant.
This comes as little surprise, as time-series diagnostics
in Appendix B in the supporting information reveal that
changes to tone are short-lived—indeed, less than 50%
of a change in tone remains after a month, less than 25%
the following month. Clearly, where tone is concerned,
the impact of the economy occurs through short-term
changes; although sizable, the effects do not stand the
test of time.19 This is of consequence for our analysis of
public opinion, as we will see.
The Economy, theMedia, and Public
Sentiment
How does media content influence public economic sen-
timent? Answering the question is not straightforward,
as there is reason to suppose that public economic senti-
ment influences media coverage itself. This may be true
for various reasons. Journalists may be representative of
the broader population. They also may see themselves
as representatives, aiming to reflect public concerns be-
cause it is the right thing to do.Of course, in a competitive
marketplace, they also have incentives to produce content
reflecting what consumers want.
Only a handful of studies have considered the possi-
bility of bidirectional causality between media and opin-
ion. Some find evidence of causality running in both
directions. Indeed, Stevenson, Gonzenbach, and David
19Separate analyses using the unemployment rate reveal a similar
pattern: short-term changes in economic conditions (particularly
for unemployment) matter, whereas long-term levels do not. See
Appendix C in the supporting information for further discussion;
results are available upon request.
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TABLE 5 Tests of Causality
DV
Economic Media: Media:
Evaluations Count Tone
Retrospective Evaluations
Economic Evaluations — 5.854∗ 15.590∗∗∗
Leading Indicators .759 18.565∗∗∗ .416
Media: Count .069 — 2.687
Media: Tone 19.228∗∗∗ 1.267 —
Prospective Evaluations
Economic Evaluations — 1.891 18.840∗∗∗
Leading Indicators 5.433∗ 33.693∗∗∗ 4.152∗
Media: Count 1.874 — .281
Media: Tone 2.938a 1.818 —
Note: Cells contain chi-square values from tests of statistical sig-
nificance, based on VAR models using a single lag of all variables
in levels.
ap < .10, ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
(1994) find that public perceptions of the economy have
a stronger effect on media coverage than coverage has on
perceptions; Haller and Norpoth (1997) reach a similar
conclusion; andWuet al. (2002) find amorebalanced, but
clearly bidirectional, relationship. Another body of work
points toward a simple unidirectional effect of media on
opinion: Each of Fan (1993), Blood and Phillips (1995,
1997), and Hollanders and Vliegenthart (2011) find that
media coverage Granger-causes economic perceptions,
and not the other way around.
Is there evidence of bidirectional causality in ourme-
dia and opinion data? To begin with, Table 5 shows tests
of Granger causality for four variables: sociotropic eco-
nomic evaluations, and both media count and tone.20
The table contains estimates from vector autoregression
(VAR) models, using a single lag of each variable, with all
variables measured in levels. The top panel shows results
for retrospective evaluations and the bottompanel results
for prospective evaluations.
Recall that we are mostly interested in the relation-
ships between these evaluations and media coverage. The
20We do not include a model using leading economic indicators
(LEIs) as the dependent variable. Those results suggest that tone
and both retrospective and prospective evaluations cause leading
economic indicators, implying that the public and mass media
effectively anticipate leading economic indicators, or that the latter
actually reflect the former. This is true even when our revised
LEI measure excludes consumer expectations. The possibility that
leading indicators are not exogenous to our other measures is, of
course, rather problematic. That said, we do not fully trust these
results; because the leading indicator series is nonstationary, vector
autoregression results are problematic.
TABLE 6 Responsiveness of Media Coverage to
Economic Evaluations (and the
Economy)
DV
 in Count  in Tone
DVt−1 –.385∗∗∗ –.686∗∗∗
(.041) (.048)
 LEIt –4.105∗ .097∗∗∗
(1.737) (.026)
LEIt−1 –1.435∗∗∗ .002
(.383) (.005)
 Retrospective Evaluationst –.275∗ .007∗∗∗
(.117) (.002)
Retrospective Evaluationst−1 –.105∗∗ .002∗∗
(.040) (.001)
 Prospective Evaluationst .103 .005a
(.165) (.002)
Prospective Evaluationst−1 .104 .003a
(.108) (.002)
Constant 27.511∗∗∗ .134∗∗∗
(3.167) (.023)
N 380 380
R-squared .223 .386
Note: Cells contain OLS coefficients with standard errors in paren-
theses.
ap < .10, ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
results do suggest the possibility of bidirectional causality,
at least with respect to media tone. In each case, the con-
tent of media coverage leads public opinion, but opinion
leads coverage aswell. This is especially true for retrospec-
tive evaluations; for prospective assessments, the analysis
implies that causality runs primarily from the public to
media coverage, as the impact of media on evaluation is
not highly reliable (p < .10). Of course, Granger tests of-
fer limited information, particularly where we expect that
relationships are current, not lagged. While these tests
provide some useful diagnostics, then, they cannot really
resolve the issue of directionality in such circumstances.
That said, we can estimate ECMs of both opinion and
media coverage that include the other potentially endoge-
nous variable. For instance, current changes in opinion
can be modeled as a function of lagged opinion, current
changes and lagged levels of media content, and current
changes and lagged levels of leading indicators. The co-
efficient for current changes in media content can tell us
little about the effect of media on public opinion, as it
may be that it also captures the reciprocal effect of opin-
ion on coverage. But the effect of lagged levels of media
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TABLE 7 Responsiveness of Economic Evaluations toMedia (and the Economy)
DV
 in Retrospective Evaluations  in Prospective Evaluations
DVt−1 –.082∗∗∗ –.081∗∗∗ –.241∗∗∗ –.241∗∗∗
(.017) (.017) (.031) (.031)
 LEIt 3.836∗∗∗ 3.697∗∗∗ 1.214∗ 1.216a
(.843) (.846) (.617) (.619)
LEIt−1 –.089 –.080 –.316∗∗ –.316∗∗
(.169) (.169) (.118) (.118)
Media Countt –.042 –.042 –.001 –.001
(.025) (.025) (.018) (.018)
Media Countt−1 –.037 –.045∗ .016 .016
(.022) (.022) (.015) (.015)
Media Tonet 8.977∗∗∗ 8.672∗∗∗ 4.882∗∗∗ 4.887∗∗∗
(1.670) (1.677) (1.200) (1.206)
Media Tonet−1 9.670∗∗∗ 4.464 4.200∗∗ 4.304
(1.890) (3.716) (1.377) (2.630)
Interaction: Count × Tonet−1 .068 –.001
(.042) (.031)
Constant .095 .844 .034 .017
(1.735) (1.791) (1.249) (1.303)
N 380 380 380 380
R-squared .231 .236 .180 .180
Note: Cells contain coefficients with standard errors in parentheses from OLS models.
ap < .10, ∗p <.05 ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
content is likely more revealing about the effect of media
on opinion. There is little basis for supposing that pre-
vious coverage would be endogenous to current changes
in opinion, after all; lagged levels of media content are
likely exogenous. The same is true for a model of media
coverage that includes lagged opinion as a regressor. Us-
ing these ECMs, then, we may be able to identify “true”
lagged effects of media coverage on opinion, as well as
lagged effects of opinion on media coverage.21
Table 6 shows results for ECMs of media content.
Here changes in either the count or tone of media con-
tent are regressed on (a) lagged levels of media content,
(b) current changes and lagged levels of both retrospec-
tive and prospective economic sentiment, and (c) current
changes and lagged levels of leading indicators. As we
have already seen, media content reflects the state of the
economy, primarily in current changes. Results in Table 6
also suggest that economic evaluations may find their
21To be clear: note that although we estimate the effects of cur-
rent changes in both equations, endogeneity means that we cannot
conclude anything about the true nature of this concurrent re-
lationship. But lagged levels, which are likely exogenous, can be
revealing.
way into media content. Again, we only take seriously
the lagged effects of public opinion, which presumably
are exogenous to current changes in tone. That the co-
efficients for the lagged variables are meaningfully (and
significantly) smaller than those for changesmay indicate
that changes in public opinion actually are endogenous to
changes in media coverage. (In other words, endogeneity
may be inflating the coefficients relating the two concur-
rently.) Regardless, these models make clear that lagged
opinionmay influence media content independent of the
economy. And, importantly, it is retrospective evaluations
that matter most.22 This is a useful reminder that media
content is not entirelydriven by prospective features of the
economy—recall results in Tables 2 and 3 showing me-
dia responsiveness to coincident indicators as well. (That
said, even retrospective evaluations respond in part to
prospective economic trends, as we shall see below.)
Table 7 examines the opposite relationship: the ef-
fect of media on economic sentiment, both retrospective
22Note that running the same models without the LEI does not
fundamentally change the relative importance of retrospective over
prospective evaluations.
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FIGURE 4 Leading Indicators andMedia Tone during the Great Recession
and prospective. Changes in sentiment are regressed on
(a) lagged levels of sentiment, (b) current changes and
lagged levels of media content, and (c) current changes
and lagged levels of leading indicators.Amodel also shows
the results of including an interaction between media
count and tone, allowing for the possibility that the im-
pact of tone increases alongside the volume of coverage.
Results suggest that economic sentiment is related to
both the actual economy andmedia coverage. Changes in
leading economic indicators have a positive current effect
on both retrospective and prospective assessments. In-
terestingly, the effect of changes in these future-oriented
indicators is largest and most reliable for retrospections.
Prospections are driven more by the level of leading indi-
cators, which actually have a negative effect on prospec-
tions; that is, as the future economy gets better, expecta-
tions about the future get worse. This makes sense given
that leading economic indicators point to comparatively
short-run economic developments and that changes in
those indicators are most predictive of economic change
(Wlezien and Erikson 1996). The effect largely comports
with what Katona (1972) found, specifically, that eco-
nomic expectations are most optimistic when the level of
the economy is at its worst.
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Media coverage also matters for economic evalua-
tions, almost entirely through tone. (Coefficients for both
tone and count change little when each is included inde-
pendently, so we include just the complete model here.)
The number of articles is not a statistically significant de-
terminant, but the tone quite clearly is. Interacting count
and tone, in the second models in Table 7, also adds
nothing beyondwhatwe get from tone on its own, though
the coefficient in the model of retrospective evaluations
does point in the expected direction (i.e., an increase in
the impact of tone when volume increases).
As in Table 6, the effects of current changes in Table 7
tell us nothing about the impact of media coverage on
opinion, but the effects of lagged levels do. That the coef-
ficients for changes and levels inmedia tone are about the
same in each equation is suggestive about current effects,
but we stop short of drawing this conclusion. All we can
surmise is that lagged levels of tone influence public eval-
uations of the economy above and beyond the effects of
leading economic indicators. That said, the effect of tone
is only temporary. This is because tone is a stationary vari-
able, and so changes to it are themselves not permanent
(see Appendix B in the supporting information and the
discussion surrounding Table 4). By definition, then, the
impact of tone on evaluations is significant, but it does
not last.23
Discussion and Conclusions
Preceding sections have explored the nature of the rela-
tionship between the economy, news coverage, and pub-
lic sentiment. The analyses point to some interesting and
important results. First, media content is more likely to
reflect leading indicators than either coincident or lagging
ones. Second, it is current changes in those prospective
conditions that matter most. So media content reflects
the change in the future economy more than it reflects
the level of economic conditions.
The Great Recession is illustrative. The top panel of
Figure 4 shows two lines: One is levels of the leading indi-
cators series, and the other is media tone. Each is shown
from 2007–2011 inclusive to the present, to highlight the
period of theGreat Recession.Most striking is themarked
improvement inmedia tone beginning inmid-2008, even
as the economy continued to decline.
This begs the question: Why does media content im-
prove even as the economy continues to falter? The answer
23The negative effect of leading indicators on prospections, by con-
trast, is long term. This is partiallymoderated by the effect ofmedia
tone, which itself reflects leading indicators, as we saw in Tables 3
and 6.
lies in the media focus on changes over levels. Consider
the link between media content and the economy illus-
trated in the bottompanel of Figure 4. This figure is based
on exactly the same data. Here, however, leading indica-
tors are shown not in levels, but in changes. The Pearson’s
correlation is 0.59; the two series are strongly related.Me-
dia tone may not match well with levels of the economy,
then, but it is powerfully connected to changes in those
conditions.24 In the case of the recession, this meant an
improvement in media tone even as the economy con-
tinued to decline, that is, because the rate of economic
decline slowed.
This is not a finding peculiar to the recession, of
course—as previous analyses have demonstrated, these
results hold even when we use a much longer time period
(and also when we exclude the Great Recession). Media
content regularly reacts more to changes than to levels
of mainly prospective economic conditions. The finding
is of real consequence for those interested in how the
public reacts to economic information. Past work shows
that media content on economic issues matters, above
and beyond the economy itself. Our analysis of both ret-
rospective and prospective economic sentiment provides
further evidence of this relationship. But if media mat-
ter, and if media capture—mostly, at least—the tone of
changes in the future economy, then we should expect to
see public opinion react not so much to what currently is
going on in the economy, but what is likely to be going on
soon. This has implications for consumer behavior; it also
has implications for economic voting and a wide range of
policy attitudes. It also may make more understandable
the tendency to reward politicians based on the magni-
tude and direction of economic change, and especially
where the economy is going (e.g., Erikson,MacKuen, and
Stimson 2002).
The fact that media variables are statistically signif-
icant predictors of public perceptions need not mean
that media coverage actually causes those perceptions. It
may be that media measures just do a very good job of
capturing the economy itself, better even than particular
economic indicators.While we cannot readily distinguish
this possibility from direct media causality, we can (and
24Note that the figures show the relationship between levels of me-
dia tone and economic indicators (in levels and changes), although
the ECMs focus on changes in media tone. A simple algebraic
manipulation—adding the lagged dependent variable to both sides
of the equation—produces a model in which the level of media
tone is a function of lagged tone and the change in the economy.
Representing our results in terms of levels of media tone is thus un-
problematic; the implication is that the magnitude of coefficients
in the ECM speaks not just to the relative weight of short-term
change and long-term levels in changes in the dependent variable,
but in levels of that variable as well.
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do) assess the “mediation” of economic conditions and
the relationship(s) between media content and public
perceptions. This has been our objective here, though
future work might consider carefully the degree to which
media move us closer to, or further away from, an
accurate assessment of the economy.
Future work might also examine the degree to which
these findings are generalizable to other countries, other
news topics, and a wider variety of news sources. Our
suspicion is that the findings are broadly generalizable,
but that there is some variation as well. Whether and the
extent to which that is true remains to be seen.
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